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FOREWORD
POLLYANNA, ALICE AND OTHER WOMEN
IN THE LAW
TERESA GODWIN PHELPS*
As I begin this Foreword to the Journal's Symposium on
Women and the Law, I feel obliged to answer some threshold
questions: Why a special issue dealing with women and the
law? What special relationship do women have with the law
that justifies this particular focus? Aren't women persons, after
all,just like men, and isn't the law the law, applying the same to
all persons?
The questions are not trivial, nor are the answers necessar-
ily self-evident. The answers require a special sensitivity to the
history surrounding the male-dominated American legal sys-
tem and its treatment of women. Moreover, those concerned
with these questions must take a serious look at women's lives
and be especially attentive to the stories women tell about
themselves.
American law has historically either ignored women's
existence or "protected" them into invisibility. The first Amer-
ican legal documents, the Declaration of Independence and the
original Constitution, fail to mention women.' Nor were
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. Furthermore, nothing in the records of the constitutional debates or
the Federalist Papers suggests that the founders considered women. See Sylvia
Law, The Founders on Families, 39 FLA. L. REV. 583, 586 (1987). In March of
1776, Abigail Adams wrote to her husband and advised that he and his
colleagues "Remember the Ladies" during the process of formulating the
legal system of the nascent United States. John Adams wrote to his wife in
response,
As to . . . [the legal system which you suggest], I cannot but laugh.
We have been told that our Struggle has loosened the bands of
Government every where. That Children and Apprentices were
disobedient-that schools and Colledges were grown turbulent-
that Indians slighted their Guardians and Negroes grew insolent to
their Masters. But your Letter was the first Intimation that another
Tribe more numerous and powerful than all the rest were grown
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women subsumed into the "generic" word "men," as some
would have us believe, for women were not, in American law,
created equal. In fact, the misconception that women were
included in the word men had an ironic reality for many
women. Not only were women disenfranchised and thus kept
from enjoying the same rights as men-when they married,
their legal identities faded and merged into that of their hus-
bands. Borrowing from the English law of coverture,2 Ameri-
can law held that upon marriage a woman became, for all legal
purposes, as one with her husband. At the time of the found-
ing, then, the notion of "Women and the Law" would have
been met with astonishment. What need had women for the
law as long as they had men?
Nearly a century after the founding, women began to
achieve some rights independent of men. After the sore disap-
pointment of the Civil War amendments, for which nineteenth-
century feminists had fought long and hard,3 inroads were
made as states began to adopt married women's property
acts-some states even allowed women to vote. But there were
major setbacks as the Supreme Court interpreted the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as not
encompassing the right to vote or the right to enter a profes-
sion such as law. Although women had begun to use the legal
system and the Constitution in their battle against discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex, these avenues seemed largely blocked.
Moreover, the Court used the occasions of these challenges to
engrave its perception of Woman on the American legal
psyche. When Myra Bradwell was denied admission to the Illi-
nois bar because she was a woman, she sued under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court denied her claim and described its conception of
discontented.-This is rather too coarse a Compliment but you are
so saucy, I wont blot it out.
Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776), reprinted in THE
FEMINIST PAPERS 10-11 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1973). This flippant response
aptly signifies the founders' attitude toward women's legal rights.
2. Blackstone defines coverture in this way: "By marriage, the husband
and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and
cover, she performs every thing. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, Commentaries
430.
3. Many abolitionists were also feminists and thus suffered greatly when
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments not only failed to mention
women's rights, but also explicitly, for the first time, imprinted the word
"male" into the Constitution.
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Woman: "Man is, or should be, woman's protector and
defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life." 4 And three decades later, the Court
echoed this description when, just after allowing men to con-
tract at will in Lochner,5 it allowed a state to limit the number of
hours a woman could work:
Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has
always been dependent upon man. He established his
control at the outset by superior physical strength, and
this control in various forms, with diminishing intensity,
has continued to the present. As minors, though not to
the same extent, she has been looked upon in the courts
as needing especial care that her rights may be
preserved.6
Nearly a century elapsed after the Civil War amendments
before the nation's attitudes toward women changed. The
nature of the transformation was monumental. In 1963, Con-
gress passed the Equal Pay Act.7 Shortly thereafter, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 was enacted and became an
additional tool for combatting sex discrimination in the work-
place. And in 1971, confronting the issue of whether a state
statute could automatically prefer men to women as executors
of estates, the Court first recognized sex as coming under the
Equal Protection Clause.' Women's rights could no longer be
circumscribed by stereotypic notions about the nature of
Woman, and the Court recanted its earlier perceptions:
"There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic
paternalism' which, in practical effect, put woman, not on a
4. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873).
5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
6. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988). The Act states, in relevant part, that "No
employer.., shall discriminate... between employees on the basis of sex [by
paying unequal wages] for equal work on jobs . . . which require equal skill,
effort, and responsibility .. " Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 17 (1988). Although denied by the sponsor
of the amendment, it appears that the inclusion of "sex" in Title VII was the
result of an eleventh-hour effort to stop the legislation. See Robert Stevens
Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN.
L. REV. 877 (1967). Regardless of the motivation behind the inclusion of
"sex," Title VII was passed by Congress and became law containing the
prohibition against sex discrimination.
9. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
1992]
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pedestal, but in a cage."'° Statute after statute that differenti-
ated on the basis of sex fell. The Court redefined women as
equal to and, for all legal purposes, the same as men.
I have come to think of this approach in a not unkindly or
ungrateful way, as the Pollyanna version of women's relation-
ship to the law: As long as we are treated equal to men, every-
thing will be all right-we can make the best of the world as it
is. The legal successes of the 1970s, as well as the remarkable
inroads that women made in the professions, indeed gave us a
Pollyanna-ish optimism about women's futures.
The victories of the 1970s and early 1980s, however, also
caused us to realize that equal rights alone might not be
enough to achieve real equality for women because these
newly-won rights only gave us the right to be just like men.
When Pollyanna went to work or school, she discovered that
things did not go so well for her if she became pregnant or if
she had children to nurture. Enter Alice in Wonderland and
the realization that the world in which we live is one designed
for and by men. It was Alice who heard the Supreme Court
declare that pregnancy is not a gender-related condition."
Alice learned that the reasonable person is a man; that the ideal
worker does not get pregnant or breast-feed children; and that
the Bill of Rights, wondrous as it is, protects men from the dan-
gers of state harms, but not women from the private harms that
10. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
11. In Geduldig v. Aiello, Justice Stewart wrote the infamous footnote
that said:
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from
benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one
physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable
disabilities. While it is true that only women can become pregnant it
does not follow that every legislative classification concerning
pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those considered in Reed
and Frontiero. Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable
physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a showing
that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to
effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or
the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude
pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any
reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender
as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most
cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first
group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both
sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue
to members of both sexes.
417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974).
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most often befall them.' 2 The rights that women had achieved
got them down the rabbit-hole into a world that treats women
like men in skirts. Is this really what women wanted? Formal
equality with men as the "neutral" standard? Women and the
law took on a new twist. The issues became more complex and
focused not only on the need for equality but also on the essen-
tial differences between men and women.
The discipline we call "Women and the Law," then, is
really a study of the struggle for sex equality through history
and in all facets of life. It is an analysis of how legal, societal,
and religious conceptions of Woman have controlled women's
legal rights, and in doing so have ignored the rights and needs
of real women. As a discipline, it focuses sharply on issues that
confront women, not allowing these issues to be absorbed into
generic notions of humankind-notions that have historically
served only to debilitate women's claims. It often compels us
to break down our traditional public/private distinctions as
issues concerning women encompass both the workplace and
the home. As the twentieth century draws to a close, the thorn-
iest issues surrounding women and the law are those dealing
with the fact, not the stereotype, that many women become
mothers.
This issue of the Journal contains diverse articles discuss-
ing the relationship of women to the law and the legal system.
Despite dissimilar approaches, four articles analyze legal
problems that arise because women are mothers. Two articles,
Donna Marie Eansor's To Bespeak the Obvious: A Substantive Equal-
ity Analysis of Reproduction and Equal Employment 13 and Mary Ann
Mason's Beyond Equal Opportunity: A New Vision for Women Work-
ers,' 4 confront the "Alice" problem, the male-centered work-
place, directly. Mason offers a critique of the equal opportunity
approach in dealing with the problems of working women. "A
new vision," she argues, "must ... include the central reality of
family responsibilities in the everyday life of working
women.'15 She puts forth a "woman's rights strategy" that can
"recognize and promote the role of motherhood and the family
12. See Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 TENN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1992).
13. Donna Marie Eansor, To Bespeak the Obvious: A Substantive Equality
Analysis of Reproduction and Equal Employment, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 417 (1992).
14. Mary Ann Mason, Beyond Equal Opportunity: A New Vision for Women
Workers, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 393 (1992).
15. Id. at 414.
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in the lives of women." 16 She demonstrates that attempts to
achieve equality at work through Title VII lawsuits have largely
failed, in the instance of comparable worth for example,
because the arguments in these cases conflict with the concept
of individualistic liberty inherent in Title VII. Rather than try-
ing to achieve equality at work via the courts, then, women
should resort to collective action to change the very structure
of the workplace.
Eansor similarly argues for substantive rather than formal
equality for women, in that substantive equality works to level
the playing field by taking gender differences into account. She
uses a recent Supreme Court case, 7 in which all fertile women
had been denied jobs because of toxic workplace conditions
which might endanger their potential fetuses to illustrate her
point: substantive equality analysis produces more equitable
results than does formalistic equality analysis in cases that
involve reproductive issues.
Both writers enter into the current equal or special treat-
ment debate that has divided feminist legal scholars. Recogniz-
ing that special treatment for women, because of their
reproductive capabilities, risks reinforcing the stereotypes of
women as only mothers and caregivers, both Mason and Ean-
sor seek to develop a new analytical structure that circumvents
that pitfall.
Taking a very different tack, Lorraine Schmall, in Women
and Children First, But Only If the Men Are Union Members: Hiring
Halls and Delinquent Child-Supporters,8 identifies women, like
union members, as oppressed members of society. Acknowl-
edging that divorced women with children are among the most
disempowered, she nonetheless argues against asking unions
to help the state collect child-support payments from their
members who are delinquent in these payments. Unions and
women, she posits, are similarly powerless and should not be
pitted against each other in ways that undermine their com-
monalities. Instead, the state should remedy the widespread
problem of failure to pay child support by other means.
In Rusty Pipes: The Rust Decision and the Supreme Court's Free
Flow Theory of the First Amendment, 9 Phillip J. Cooper advances a
harsh critique of the recent Supreme Court decision that allows
16. Id.
17. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
18. Lorraine Schmall, Women and Children First, But Only if the Men Are
Union Members: Hiring Halls and Delinquent Child-Supporters, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 449 (1992).
19. Phillip J. Cooper, Rusty Pipes: The Rust Decision and the Supreme Court's
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the government to regulate the kind of advice a pregnant
woman can receive from a government-supported family plan-
ning clinic. Cooper uses traditional free speech arguments,
rather than women's rights arguments, to advance his conten-
tion that these regulations, which specifically prohibited clinics
from talking about abortion, are unconstitutional: "Congress
may choose not to fund clinics at all but, if it elects to fund the
clinics, it may not do so in a way that violates the Constitution"
by circumscribing the kinds of pregnancy counseling that may
take place.20
In addition to the "pregnancy problem," women in the
public world of work and education encounter other problems
related to their biological differences from men. Barbara A.
Gutek's article offers interesting information on one of the hot-
test of these issues-sexual harassment. As claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act began to open the workplace to
women, it became clear that merely eliminating the overt dis-
crimination that barred women's entry into many jobs would
not be enough to achieve true equality. If women were to suc-
ceed and be equal to men in the workplace, other harms had to
be abolished: all gender-based exclusions, even if they
appeared in the guise of "job necessities," had to be elimi-
nated; affirmative action programs that actively encouraged
and facilitated women's entry into male dominated fields had to
be established; wage disparities between traditional "men's"
and "women's" jobs had to be equalized; and women had to be
protected in the workplace from conditions that had, in the
past, forced them to leave. One widespread harmful condition
that had driven women from jobs was the invisible, unnamed
harm of sexual harassment.
Gutek's article delineates the results of social science
research on the attitudes toward sexual harassment taken by
various kinds of people. The research demonstrates, not sur-
prisingly, that men and women define and react to sexual har-
assment differently and also shows just how widespread sexual
harassment is. Most tellingly, the research reveals that women
frequently lose their jobs after reporting harassment and, if
they manage to keep their jobs, still undergo unseen injuries,
including "lower productivity, less job satisfaction, reduced
self-confidence, and a loss of motivation and commitment to
their work and their employer. They may also avoid men who
Free Flow Theory of the First Amendment, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
359 (1992).
20. Id. at 386.
19921
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are known harassers, even though contact with those men is
important for their work."'"
But the discipline of "Women and the Law" does not
regard only the public sphere. The private world of home and
family, a world in which the law has infrequently and uneasily
entered, is also in need of scrutiny and reform. Lenore Walker,
in Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense,22 takes up a contro-
versial aspect of the special or equal treatment debate. Should
we allow battered women who kill their abusers a special kind
of self-defense plea that takes their circumstances as a victim of
battering into account? Walker, herself a frequent expert wit-
ness on the battered woman syndrome, argues that the reason-
ableness standard used in self-defense pleas is based upon a
man's perceptions of danger, not an abused woman's. Such a
woman, Walker explains, may reasonably and justifiably per-
ceive herself to be in mortal danger even if her abuser is not, at
that time, attacking her. And the only way for the jury to
understand her perceptions is to hear expert testimony about
the psychological make-up of women who have been battered
over a long period of time. Equal justice, argues Walker, can
only result when the self-defense standard, developed by and
for men, is changed to reflect an abused woman's perception of
danger.
The particular feminist critiques of the law exemplified in
some of the symposium articles underscore the dilemma that
Gregory Bassham bravely engages in his article Feminist Legal
Theory: A Critical Introduction."3 Although women's causes have
generally been seen as part of the liberal agenda, the more
recent feminist approaches that insist on different or special
treatment for women explicitly reject liberalism. Bassham puts
forth a critique of three radical strains present in feminist the-
ory that directly challenge liberal principles: the subordination-
domination approach (most frequently identified with the work
of Catharine MacKinnon), the "different voice" approach
(most frequently identified with the work of Carol Gilligan),
and the specific issue that pornography is sex discrimination
against women (primarily the work of MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin). Displaying great sensitivity to the less radical femi-
nist claims that the legal system has done far too little to foster
21. Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, 6 NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 335 (1992).
22. Lenore Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321 (1992).
23. Gregory Bassham, Feminist Legal Theory: A Critical Introduction, 6
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 293 (1992).
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gender equality, that it has blindly adhered to a "neutral" stan-
dard that is essentially male, that it has emphasized rules and
rights over community and relationships, and that it has too
long ignored substantial harms to women, Bassham sees none
of these claims as inconsistent with traditional liberalism. The
more radical feminist positions he describes as "indefensible
extensions of basically sound critiques" that fail to go "to the
heart of liberal jurisprudence . . ., to show that the core princi-
ples of liberal legal thought are fatally flawed." 24
The wide breadth of articles included in this Symposium
on Women and the Law amply confirms that the discipline
"Women and the Law" no longer meets with astonishment or
skepticism. They also make clear that Pollyanna and Alice,
though crucial components of the multifaceted voice of
women, no longer speak or work alone. Women need not pre-
tend that everything is solved once they have achieved formal
equality; they need not try to live and compete in a world inex-
orably designed for men. They may raise their various and
sometimes contradictory voices and be heard and taken seri-
ously. They may belong to a community of legal scholars,
exemplified by this Symposium, where issues are raised and
answers sought.
24. Id. at 319.
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